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On a hillside overlooking Gold Trail Ele-
mentary School in an area of Coloma, California, 
known as Gold Hill, there is a solitary grave of a 
young woman who died nearly 130 years ago.  
One side of the headstone reads, In Memory of 
OKEI, Died 1871. Aged 19 years. (A Japanese 
Girl).  The other side is written in Japanese:  
[nihon kokoku meiji shinen, gappi bossu, OKEI 
no haka, gyonen jukyusai] 
Okei was a member of what is known as the 
Wakamatsu Colony; a group of more than twenty 
Japanese who arrived in northern California in 
the summer of 1869.  Lasting for two years, the 
Wakamatsu colonists built a tea and silk farm 
which was initially successful but ultimately 
failed due to a lack of water and a lack of money.  
Most of the colonists then left the area, and the 
fates of only three are known in any detail.  
Okei was one of three Japanese who remained in 
Coloma.1  Tragically, she died  perhaps from 
malaria  soon after the breakup of the colony. 
As the Wakamatsu Colony existed two dec-
ades before Japanese immigration to the United 
States was even a trickle, why did this group of 
Japanese leave their familiar home in Aizu and 
embark on a perilous journey overseas?2  The 
                                                   
1Sakurai Matsunosuke worked as a farmhand and 
lived the remainder of his life in Coloma, where he 
died and was buried in 1901.  It was Sakurai who 
had the headstone made for Okeis grave.  Ma-
sumizu Kuninosuke lived in Coloma for more than 
ten years before moving to Sacramento, and then on 
to Colusa where he died in 1915.  While in Co-
loma, Masumizu married Carrie Wilson, a woman 
of Indian and African-American descent, and they 
had at least three children who survived infancy.  
Masumizus descendants are the only known de-
scendants of the Japanese who left Aizu and came 
to California as part of the Wakamatsu Colony. See 
Note 4 for sources on the Wakamatsu Colony. 
2According to Ninth Census of the United States, 
The Statistics of the Population of the United States 
[1870], Volume 1, Washington: Government Print-
short answer is that they were from Wakamatsu, 
the castle town of Aizu domain, and were sub-
jects of Aizus daimyo, Matsudaira Katamori-a 
prominent opponent of the Satsuma and Cho-
shu-led movement that ultimately overthrew the 
shogun and the bakufu government.  The Wa-
kamatsu colonists were on the losing side of the 
Meiji Restoration; and like many people who end 
up on the losing side of political upheaval, they 
left their country as refugees in search of a new 
life. 
This paper does not directly explore the issue 
of how these early Japanese immigrants struggled 
to survive in a strange land.3  It explores the 
issue of why they fled Japan for a strange land.  
Moreover, this paper challenges Japans national 
narrative, a narrative that asserts a relatively 
peaceful transfer of power from the Tokugawa 
bakufu to the samurai leaders from Satsuma and 
Choshu who claimed their tōbaku (anti-bakufu) 
movement in the name of the Emperor. 
 
 
Matsudaira Katamori, Aizu and Civil War 
 
When United States Navy Commodore Mat-
thew Perry and his fleet of black ships ap-
peared in Uraga Bay near Edo in 1853, Japan was 
thrown into a state of confusion about how to 
deal with the threat from the West.  Two and a 
                                                                          
ing Office, 1872, p. 8, pp. 15-16, and pp. 90-91, 
there were 55 Japanese in the United States.  
Thirty-three were in California; of these 22 were in 
El Dorado County, all at Gold Hill in Coloma.  
The 1870 federal census is the first that lists Japa-
nese residents in the United States.  The unpub-
lished manuscript schedules of the 1870 Census, 
State of California, El Dorado County contain the 
names of 22 Japanese at Coloma Township. 
3For a fuller account of these Japanese colonists in 
California, see John E. Van Sant, Pacific Pioneers: 
Japanese Journeys to America and Hawaii, 
1850-1880, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 2000, chapter 6; Henry Taketa, 1969-The 
Centennial Year, Pacific Historian, Vol. 13, No. 1; 
Ki Kimura, The Japanese Mayflower, Japan 
Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 3; and Ichiyo Yamamoto, 
Wakamatsu koroni no ato wo tazunete, 
Aizu-Wakamatsu: Northern Japan Publishers, 1985. 
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half centuries after the West had been kicked out 
of Japan (with the exception of the handful of 
Dutch allowed on Deshima Island in Nagasaki 
Bay), they were back.  Unlike two and a half 
centuries earlier, the Western powerseven a 
middling power such as the United Stateswere 
now far more powerful than Japan, both eco-
nomically and militarily.  The Tokugawa sho-
guns had no practical alternative except to sign 
lopsided agreements on trade, extraterritoriality, 
and other matters.  The baku-han system, upon 
which the legitimacy and hegemony of the To-
kugawa bakufu depended, had been unraveling 
for many years.  And then Perrys arrival and 
the subsequent unequal treaties ripped wide 
open a Pandoras Box of long-simmering griev-
ances among daimyo, their samurai vassals, and 
the Tokugawa bakufu.  A few tozama domains 
with large numbers of samurai and the 
all-but-forgotten imperial house grabbed this 
golden opportunity of Western-induced commo-
tion to challenge the legitimacy of Tokugawa 
bakufu rule. 
Matsudaira Katamori (1835-1893) did not fit 
into the two major categories of daimyo: fudai 
(hereditary vassal of the Tokugawa shogunate) 
and tozama (outside lord).4  He was one of a 
small number of kamon daimyo, a division of 
shimpan daimyo, who were related to the ruling 
Tokugawa family. 5  Hoshina Masayuki 
(1611-1672), considered the founder of Aizu do-
main, was a son of Tokugawa Hidetada, the sec-
ond Tokugawa shogun.  Because Hoshinas 
biological mother was one of Hidetadas concu-
                                                   
4A useful, though somewhat romanticized biogra-
phy of Matsudaira Katamori is Ryoichi Hoshi, Ma-
tsudaira Katamori to sono jidai, Aizu-Wakamatsu: 
Rekishi Shubunsha, Northern Japan Publishers, 
1984. For another account of Aizu, Matsudaira 
Katamori, and the Boshin War see Teruko Craig, 
Introduction in Goro Shiba, Remembering Aizu: 
The Testament of Shiba Goro, Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1999. 
5Another way to delineate the difference is that 
sanke daimyo (from the Tokugawa domains of Mito, 
Owari, and Kii) were the senior shimpan while the 
kamon were the junior shimpan.  This difference 
among shimpan daimyo, however, was not always 
clear. 
bines, Hidetadas wife insisted that their son 
Iemitsu succeed Hidetada as shogun.  Neverthe-
less, Hoshina and all Aizu daimyo who suc-
ceeded him were close advisors to the Tokugawa 
shogunate. 
In 1862, with Kyoto fast becoming the 
headquarters for the anti-bakufu movement, the 
shogun appointed twenty-six year-old Matsudaira 
Katamori of Aizu as shugoshoku (defender) of 
the imperial capital.  In this hazardous position, 
Matsudaira carefully navigated between the dis-
parate anti-bakufu forces who demanded Japans 
return to the national seclusion policy and the 
expulsion of all foreigners, and the bakufu which 
contended that increased, regulated contact and 
trade with the West was regrettable but inevita-
ble.6  In a message to the bakufu in late 1862, 
Matsudaira criticized the shoguns government 
for treating foreigners with consideration, 
leading to a truly grievous state of affairs.7  
Yet, he also disparaged the idea of returning to 
the policy of national seclusion because Japan 
would then have no means of understanding 
foreign conditions and adopting their ways where 
they are good.8  By this Matsudaira meant that 
Westerners built great ships and guns which he 
believed would help strengthen Japans own 
military forces.9  Such views may appear con-
tradictory, but they demonstrate Matsudairas 
belief in Sakuma Shozans Eastern ethics, West-
                                                   
6Dating from the early 17th century, the national 
seclusion policy (sakoku) was originally designed to 
limit trade and contact with the West.  The national 
seclusion policy did not include Japans East Asian 
neighbors, nor was it universally enforced.  See 
Naohiro Asao, Sakoku, Tokyo: Shogakkan, 1975; 
Ronald Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern 
Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa 
Bakufu, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991, 
2nd edition; and Brett Walker, Reappraising the 
Sakoku Paradigm: The Ezo Trade and the Extension 
of Tokugawa Political Space Into Hokkaido, Jour-
nal of Asian History Vol. 30, No. 2 (1996). 
7Matsudaira Katamori to bakufu, November 8, 1862, 
in W.G. Beasley, ed. and trans., Select Documents 
On Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853-1868, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 225-26. 
8Ibid., p. 226. 
9Ibid. 
NOVEMBER 2000      EARLY MODERN JAPAN                  16 
 
 
ern science philosophy that many samurai 
adopted during the turbulent bakumatsu era.  
Furthermore, as Harold Bolitho writes of Matsu-
daira during this period, he managed to tread a 
very distinct path which, while leaving him on 
reasonably good terms with both bakufu and 
Court also helped him avoid anything like a total 
commitment to either of them.10  Evidence of 
this can be found in the November 1862 message 
to the bakufu cited above, in which Matsudaira 
identified himself as an advocate of kōbu gattai 
(court-bakufu harmony); a vague, mid-
dle-of-the-road policy promoted by a handful of 
daimyo and court nobles. 
Relations between Matsudaira and the samu-
rai of Satsuma, Choshu, and other anti-bakufu 
proponents in Kyoto were anything but harmoni-
ous.  Political intrigue, assassinations, and spo-
radic fighting typified the fractious relationship 
among these anti-bakufu groups and Matsudairas 
forces throughout the 1860s.  Satsuma officials 
challenged Aizu by trying to have their own dai-
myo, Shimazu Hisamitsu, replace Matsudaira as 
defender of Kyoto immediately after the Aizu 
daimyo took up his post.   Samurai from Cho-
shu, generally considered more radical and bel-
ligerent than those from Satsuma, were quick to 
defy bakufu policies and constantly antagonized 
the Aizu daimyo and his samurai in Kyoto.  In 
1864, Matsudaira wanted to battle Choshu samu-
rai encamped just outside of the imperial city, but 
the shogun demurred.  The following year, Ma-
tsudaira helped lead the first bakufu campaign 
against Choshu domain, which ended when Cho-
shu officials pledged their allegiance to the sho-
gun.  In 1866, he became furious with the ba-
kufu for calling off the second campaign against 
Choshu.11  In essence, while Matsudaira pro-
moted the fence-riding policy of court-bakufu 
harmony, his military policy was staunchly ori-
ented against Satsuma and Choshu. 
Soon after Tokugawa Yoshinobu resigned his 
post as shogun in late 1867, the imperial court 
                                                   
10Harold Bolitho, Aizu, 1853-1868, Proceedings 
of the British Association for Japanese Studies Vol. 
2, 1977, p. 9. 
11 Ibid.; Conrad Totman, The Collapse of the Toku-
gawa Bakufu, 1862-1868, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1980, p. 288-89. 
dismissed Matsudaira and his Aizu samurai from 
guarding the palace in Kyoto.12  They were re-
placed by Satsuma and Choshu samurai, who had 
gained control of the imperial court and the fif-
teen year-old Emperor. In late January 1868, the 
forces of Aizu and Kuwana (the domain of Ma-
tsudairas brother, Sadaaki), along with bakufu 
samurai from other Tokugawa domains, were 
defeated in fierce battles with Satsuma, Choshu 
and other newly-designated imperial forces at 
Toba and Fushimi outside Kyoto.  Won by the 
imperial forces, these military encounters marked 
the end of 268 years of Tokugawa bakufu control 
of Japan, and the beginning of the Meiji Era.  
They also represented the beginning of a civil war, 
known as the Boshin War, that raged throughout 
most of 1868. 
The imperial forces marched to Edo and took 
control of the shoguns capital, of nearby Yoko-
hama, and of the central government after a few 
days of fighting against Tokugawa loyalists.  
The new government, consisting primarily of 
samurai from Satsuma and Choshu, issued an 
imperial proclamation declaring that Matsudaira 
and the Aizu domain were traitors fighting in 
the rebellion.13  Tokugawa Yoshinobu gave up 
all his powers to the Emperor and quietly re-
turned to his home domain of Mito.  Matsudaira 
and his samurai returned to Aizu in northern Ja-
pan and prepared for war. 
Matsudaira refused to capitulate because the 
new imperial forces had yet to prove that they 
actually controlled Japan.  Japan had over 250 
semi-autonomous domains and it would be an 
enormous burden to centralize and control such 
an unwieldy conglomeration of mini-states.  
Moreover, Matsudaira and some other northern 
daimyo considered the imperial restoration as 
little more than a coup by their hated southern 
rivals, a coup that might not succeed if decisively 
challenged.  In 1868, no one knew that the Sat-
suma/Choshu coup would ultimately succeed and 
                                                   
12 The shogun presumed he was to exercise his 
powers until a general council of daimyo reached a 
decision. 
13This Proclamation By the Mikado was issued to 
foreign legations on February 8, 1868, and can be 
found in FRUS 1867-68, pp. 714-15.  See also 
Totman, p. 442. 
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the result would be the Meiji Restoration. 
Matsudaira may not have realized that among 
his supporters were Americans living in Japan.  
A United States Navy doctor stationed in Yoko-
hama gleefully wrote in his diary on May 26, 
1868, that Aidzu has flogged the troops of Sat-
suma in every engagement.  From all accounts 
the cause of Aidzu is not a bad one.  We are all 
anxious to see him win the day....14 The next 
day he wrote, Everyone is an Aidzu man now.15  
Matsudaira probably received such unsolicited 
support because American officials presumed he 
was fighting on behalf of the shogun, whom they 
credited with observing the treaties, and of 
strengthening the friendly relations with other 
countries, especially the United States . . . .16  
Robert Van Valkenberg, the American minister to 
Japan, maintained formal neutrality during Ja-
pans civil war; but his messages to the State De-
partment throughout 1868 clearly indicated his 
support for Matsudaira and Shogun Yoshinobu.17  
He even allowed the shogun and some of his ba-
kufu officials safe haven aboard the United States 
Navys Iroquois anchored in Osaka Bay after the 
battles at Toba and Fushimi.18  In comparison 
with the constant anti-foreign rhetoric of the 
anti-bakufu forces and the danger posed by 
anti-foreign rōnin, the shogun and Matsudaira 
appeared supportive of American interests to 
American diplomats. 
After battling other northern domains in the 
summer of 1868, the imperial forces marched 
                                                   
14 Elinor and James Barnes, eds., Naval Sur-
geon--Revolt In Japan 1868-1869: The Diary of 
Samuel Pellman Boyer, Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1963, p. 48. 
15Ibid., p. 49. 
16FRUS 1867-68, Pt. 1, Van Valkenberg to Seward, 
January 16, 1868, p. 619. 
17Numerous messages from Van Valkenberg to Sec-
retary of State William H. Seward in the 1867-1869 
volumes of FRUS and Despatches attest to his sup-
port for the shogun and Matsudaira. 
18FRUS 1867-68, Pt. 1, Van Valkenberg to Seward, 
February 3, 1868, p. 636.  According to this mes-
sage, the shogun was aboard the Iroquois for two 
hours while waiting for his own ship to arrive and 
take him back to Edo. 
into Aizu in September.19  The single most fa-
mous, tragic, and romanticized event in Aizus 
long history took place during this war when 
twenty teenaged boys of the Byakkotai (White 
Tiger Brigade) committed mass suicide because 
they mistakenly thought Tsuruga Castle in Wa-
kamatsu--Matsudairas headquarters--was burn-
ing down.20 
An estimated 30,000 troops besieged Tsuruga 
Castle.  Inside the castle were 3,000 samurai and 
2,000 dependents.  The imperial armies plun-
dered and burned much of the city of Wakamatsu. 
Many of the elderly, women, and children living 
in the city committed suicide during this violent 
rampage by soldiers from Satsuma and Choshu.21  
The invading forces then sealed off the entrances 
to the castle and began a massive bombardment.  
Out of food, with many of his samurai dead or 
dying, Matsudaira realized the futility of further 
resistance and surrendered on November 5, 1868.  
Aizu lost nearly 3,000 samurai from the begin-
ning of 1868 to Matsudairas surrender in No-
vember.  This was more than twice as many as 
any other domain resisting the imperial armies.  
Satsuma and Choshu, Bolitho writes, gambled 
and won, earning for themselves positions of na-
tional eminence and responsibility.22  Matsu-
daira and Aizu gambled and lost, earning the op-
probrium of being stubborn opponents of the new 
imperial order. 
Satsuma and Choshu had condemned Ma-
tsudaira to death before the battles and Toba and 
Fushimi.23  Yet, surprisingly he was spared the 
death sentence despite his prominent role in the 
civil war.  He and Tokugawa Yoshinobu were 
                                                   
19For a personal account, see Goro Shiba, Remem-
bering Aizu: The Testament of Shiba Goro Mahito 
Ishimits). 
20Aizu no Rekish, Aizu-Wakamatsu: Aizu Bukeya-
shiki, 1989, pp. 123-24. 
21For example, Shiba Goros grandmother, mother, 
two sisters, and one sister-in-law committed suicide 
during the destruction of Wakamatsu. See Shiba, pp. 
54-59. The number of people who committed sui-
cide during the Boshin War in Aizu is unknown, but 
it was certainly in the hundreds. 
22Harold Bolitho, The Echigo War, 1868, Monu-
menta Nipponica Vol. 34, No. 3, 1979, p. 277. 
23Bolitho, Aizu,, p. 6. 
NOVEMBER 2000      EARLY MODERN JAPAN                  18 
 
 
formally pardoned in a decree issued the follow-
ing year.24  Charles De Long, who replaced Van 
Valkenberg as the United States Minister to Ja-
pan, believed that the new government, 
well-aware of its precarious control over Japan, 
decided not to execute the Aizu daimyo because 
it feared that his death by execution or ritual sui-
cide would have the inevitable consequences of 
elevating him to martyrdom and act as a unifying 
symbol to daimyo still incensed at the new Sat-
suma/Choshu-dominated government.25  After a 
brief period of imprisonment, Matsudaira became 
a Shinto priest and eventually served for many 
years as the chief priest at Toshogu Shrine in 
Nikko, the mausoleum of Tokugawa Ieyasu, the 
founder of the Tokugawa shogunate. 
The people of Aizu faced a bitter winter in 
1868-1869. The wartime destruction of Waka-
matsu and the surrounding areas led to impending 
starvation and yonaoshi (world rectification) 
uprisings throughout Aizu.26  The new imperial 
government took direct charge of the domains 
affairs and, writes Marius Jansen, no other do-
main was treated as harshly as Aizu in the af-
termath of the civil war.27  Disillusioned, desti-
tute, and branded as traitors, thousands of Aizus 
people migrated to northern Tohoku and Hok-
kaido in search of food, refuge, and a new life in 
post-Tokugawa Japan.  Many of those who left 
Aizu were forced by the imperial government to 
move to a newly created, dreary domain on the 
Shimokita Peninsula in the northernmost corner 
of Honshu.28  The destruction of Aizu, resulting 
from the political transformation from Tokugawa 
to Meiji, also pushed a handful of these refugees 
to seek a new life by establishing a tea and silk 
                                                   
24Dispatches, Vol. 13, Letter Accompanying Par-
don Decree, Signed By Daijokwan, and Decree. 
25Ibid., De Long to Fish, November 26, 1869. 
26Stephen Vlastos, Peasant Protests and Uprisings 
In Tokugawa Japan, pp. 142-53. 
27Marius B. Jansen, The Meiji Restoration, in The 
Cambridge History of Japan: Volume 5, The Nine-
teenth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, p. 359.  Bolitho makes similar judg-
ments in Aizu, pp. 3-6. 
28Aizu no Rekishi, pp. 127-28.  The population of 
the city of Wakamatsu dropped from 70,000 before 
the civil war to around 16,000 afterwards. 
colony in a strange, overseas land they may have 
heard of but certainly knew almost nothing about: 
the California frontier. 
 
Lost In History 
 
Aizus prominent position in the history of 
the Meiji Restoration has been noted in a few 
specialist works (especially by Harold Bolitho), 
and the Boshin War is often noted-albeit 
briefly-in Japanese language narratives of mod-
ern Japanese history.  Yet, in most survey narra-
tives of Japan history by Western or Japanese 
scholars, Aizus role in the Meiji Restoration is at 
most only briefly mentioned despite Matsudaira 
Katamori and Aizus prominence as the most ac-
tive opponents of the Satsuma and Cho-
shu-dominated imperial coalition.  Why has 
Aizu been lost in this extremely important and 
influential event of Japans history?  There are, I 
believe three interrelated reasons. 
First is that the losers version of history is 
rarely the dominant national narrative-and Aizu 
was clearly on the losing side of the Meiji 
Restoration. 
Second is that the nineteenth century was, in 
addition to being a century of industrialization, a 
century of nationalist emphasis.  France, Britain, 
Germany, the United States, and then Japan cre-
ated national symbols and emphasized national 
traditions, including the promotion of national 
narratives.  In Japan, nationalism was increas-
ingly emphasized from the 1868 Meiji Restora-
tion onwards as a method of creating unity 
among a historically diverse people whose pri-
mary political and social loyalties were to their 
villages and domains.29 
Third, the once semi-autonomous, semi-in-
dependent domains of the Tokugawa era were 
transformed into fewer prefectures, which were 
                                                   
29See Carol Gluck, Japans Modern Myths: Ideology 
in the Late Meiji Period, Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1985; Takashi Fujitani, Splendid 
Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996; and 
Daikichi Irokawa, Meiji no bunka, Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1970, published in English as The Culture 
of the Meiji Period, trans. ed. Marius Jansen, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 
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were increasingly controlled by a central gov-
ernment creating and promoting a nationalist ide-
ology.  In other words, disparate regional areas 
of Japan were turned into peripheries of the na-
tion, and the core of the nation was the newly 
re-named capital of Tokyo, which would be con-
trolled for more than two generations by the for-
mer samurai of Satsuma and Choshu (and to a 
lesser extent by their former allies from Tosa and 
Hizen). These former samurai controlled not only 
the nation but also the nations history, which 
taught that there had not been a violent transfer of 
political power from the old regime to the new 
regime as was common among other nations.  
According to this national history, there had been 
a peaceful transfer from the shogun to the Em-
peror because from the dawn of time Japanese 
had always been unique, united, and virtuous. 
During the twilight of the Tokugawa Era and 
the dawn of the Meiji Era, Japan underwent a 
momentous political transformation, a transfor-
mation that in many ways charted the course of 
Japans history in the 19th and 20th centuries.  
Aizu was caught in the midst of this political 
transformation.  Worldwide nationalism and 
nationalization of Japan left little room in the 
historical narrative for those who had challenged 





In the 1960s, local historians in Aizu and 
northern California managed to get the Japanese 
American Citizens League and the California 
State government to designate 1969 as the cen-
tennial year of Japanese immigration to the 
United States because of the arrival of the Wa-
kamatsu colonists in 1869.  Governor Ronald 
Reagan and Japanese Consul General Shima 
Seiichi came to Coloma on June 7, 1969 and 
dedicated a state historical plaque at the former 
site of the Wakamatsu Colony.  One of the 
sponsors of the centennial year and the dedication 
ceremony was the Bank of Tokyo of California, 
whose chairman was Matsudaira Ichiro, the 
grandson of Matsudaira Katamori.  Every year 
in Aizu there is a ceremony on Mt. Iimori to 
honor the memory of those who sacrificed their 
lives during the Boshin War.  This solemn 
ceremony is always attended by descendants of 
Matsudaira Katamori.  The memory of Aizus 
history may have been conveniently and deliber-
ately forgotten by the national narrative, but the 
people of Aizu have continued to remember those 
who sacrificed and struggled on behalf of Aizus 
challenge to the Tokugawa-Meiji transformation 
of Japan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
